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Abstract  
 We propose a rural household’s risk management framework to 
investigate whether the low take-up of index-based insurance may depend, 
first, on the heterogeneity of the product’s attributes and, second, on a 
substitution effect between the insurance and on-farm and off-farm risk 
management strategies. We conducted a discrete choice experiment in 
Ethiopia with a sample of farmers using a weather security with fixed 
compensation in case of drought. We offered securities with different 
combinations of attributes: premium, compensation, preferred season, 
frequency of drought, sale location, and time of premium payment, allowing 
for interest payment and administration and distribution costs. We used a 
Mixed Logit Model. We find that while available risk management strategies 
are not important in the decision to buy insurance, heterogeneity in the 
demand is remarkable and relies on the indemnity and home delivery 
attributes, the type of drought insurance (for moderate or severe drought), 
and the capacity to appreciate the value of insurance.  
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Introduction 
 Consequences on rural households and individuals in developing 
countries of man-made or natural risks or shocks may be classified into 
disasters or adverse, non catastrophic conditions. The latter, although less 
harsh,  may challenge farmers and limit their potential to develop and 
innovate. Traditional risk management strategies followed by households, 
such as reducing exposure, cumulating money buffers, looking for credit, 
diversifying the economic activities, or participating  in informal insurance 
mechanisms may indeed help to comply with this vulnerability. However, as 
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some studies stress, they have some limits (Fafchamps, 1999), related to their 
rigidity or their inability to succeed when the risk is covariant (Dercon, 
2003). This is the case of rainfall risk, a major problem in agriculture, 
especially in remote rural areas. Innovative risk management strategies, on 
the other side, include the access to formal crop insurance which is still 
under study and in a pilot phase in most low-income countries. Factors such 
as the suitability of the contract to rural households’ preferences and the need 
to reduce information asymmetries, as well as the difficulties related to the 
distribution, are a challenge as Brown (2001) explains. Furthermore, the 
limited size of the market may still limit diversification strategies. 
Asymmetric information problems, in particular, are often found in crop 
insurance: moral hazard, for example, loosens farmers’ commitment in 
production (Hess, Richter and Stoppa, 2002); this is especially evident in 
public insurance projects (Viganò, 2002). The relatively recent development 
of index-based insurance, whose compensation is related to the value taken 
by a specific climatic index correlated with crop yields (Bryla, Dana, Hess 
and Varangis, 2003) is meant to overcome the shortcomings of traditional 
insurance and to minimize ex-post verification costs (Hill and Robles, 2011); 
the compensation is due  if the index exceeds or falls short of (depending on 
the type of risk to be covered) a certain threshold. The literature on the topic 
is vast. Several types of indexes have been adopted or at least tested: area 
yield, livestock, weather indexes or weather derivatives are among the most 
common ones. (Hess, Richter, and Stoppa, 2002; Skees 2003; FAO, 1992 
and 2001; Skees, Varangis, Larson and Siegel, 2002).  In weather index 
insurance,  computing the correlation between the natural phenomena and 
the agricultural yields and, so, the due indemnity, is a complex process based 
on the adequate choice of the period of observation, the quality of data at the 
weather stations and on farmers’ production (Hess, 2003; Skees, 2003).   
 The same outcome of weather-index insurance can be achieved by 
applying a pure weather derivative where the indemnity is based on a tick 
size multiplied by the gap between the traded index and the actual 
measurement of a weather variable correlated with crop production (Hess, 
Richter, and Stoppa, 2002; Skees 2003).  These contacts are found to be 
more suitable to adapt to customers’ preferences by Hills and Robles (2011), 
even if they are becoming increasingly interchangeable with index-based 
insurance (Berg, Schmitz, Starp, Trenkel, 2004). Effectiveness of these 
contracts in helping farmers manage their revenue variability is proved by 
Hill and Robles (2011)  and Hess and Hazell (2009) in different countries of 
the world.  In fact, pilot projects and actual implementations are increasing 
over time but a general consensus on the appreciation by farmers is still 
lacking for several reasons and potential purchasers have not yet shown an 
overall appreciation (Sarris, 2013; Clark and Kalani, 2011). The lack of 
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enthusiasm depends on different factors:  basis risk exposure, high price, 
transaction costs and the difficulty in delivering the products (Skees,   2003, 
Hess, 2003, Larson et al., 2002).  All these obstacles affect farmers’ 
willingness to purchase the contract, to pay the premium and, more 
generally, to bear total transaction costs related to their purchase with respect 
to the potential advantages of such contracts. The farmers’ overall risk 
exposure, and the existence of alternatives, both formal and informal, are 
also important elements affecting the decision to purchase.  
 One important point in this analytical framework is the ability of 
farmers to implement their own combination of risk management strategies. 
In fact, while the purchase of insurance cannot cover the complete range of 
risks to which farmers are exposed, their willingness to purchase external 
insurance depends on how effective and suitable is the product in addressing 
their expectations for protection and on how able they are to combine 
traditional and more modern strategies in order to achieve what they believe 
is the optimal combination, given the budget constraint, in order to stabilize 
their revenue. In the following sections, we study whether flexibility of the 
contract and risk management strategies implemented by farmers are 
important factors affecting the willingness to pay for drought risk protection.  
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the literature on the determinants of the willingness to pay for index-based 
insurance referred to various countries in the world and with specific focus 
on Ethiopia. After a brief overview of main factors studied in the literature, 
the accent is on two specific aspects: the importance of the flexibility of 
contractual conditions to adapt to potential customers’ preferences and the 
role of alternative risk management strategies customers can implement. 
Section 3 presents the experimental design and the product’s attributes. 
Section 4 provides the results of the univariate analysis. Section 5 and 6 offer 
the presentation of the multivariate methodology and a discussion of the 
main findings. Section 7 concludes.      
 
Findings of international studies and the case of Ethiopia  
 Studies on the reasons behind the preference of rural households 
concerning index-based insurance, and on their willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for it are abundant in the literature. They mostly aim to explore the main 
factors behind the households’ choices, related to their socio-economic 
characteristics, to the products offered or to the supplier and supplying 
system. Different delivery channels may have different impact on the 
potential customers’ preferences; the type of product (for example, an index-
based policy or a weather derivative) and its features also affect the WTP, 
depending on how well they meet the expectations of the clientele. Some of 
the studies are mostly theoretical but the majority rely on field data or 
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experiments. The efficacy of experiments and the reliability of their 
outcomes are still under discussion as, while supporters show their benefits 
(Norton et al.,  2011 and 2012),  they are artificial by definition although 
they want to replicate reality,  and, in some cases, limited correlation is 
found between outcomes from experiments and choices of real insurance 
(McIntosh et al., 2013). When they are based on hypothetical products, 
answers obtained do not necessarily represent actual behaviors (Breidert, 
Hahsler, and Reutterer 2006, as quoted by Hill et al., 2013). In some studies 
such as Hill and Robles (2011) or McIntosh et al. (2013), outcomes of 
experiments and of real insurance schemes show little correlation. Norton et 
al. (2011, 2012) find the opposite. However, Hill and Veceisza (2010) state 
that small-scale field experiments have the advantage of being conducted in 
an environment in which disturbing effects, such as credit constraints or trust 
issues, are absent. More importantly, Patt et al. (2009) highlight the learning 
process triggered by experimental games, which may increase financial 
literacy and trust. On the other side, given the inexistence of a market for 
insurance products, this is often the only possible choice.  
 Factors affecting WTP found in the literature cover different aspects 
of the clientele:  their status, financial and economic situation, preferences 
and attitudes, the environmental conditions. Soil quality, agro-climatic zones, 
types of disaster risks are portrayed as objective factors by Hill and Robles 
(2011) or Sakurai and Reardon (1997).  The characteristics of the households 
are also relevant, from those related to the size and economic conditions to 
more personal ones. For example, studies show that wealth matters but has 
an ambiguous effect on the WTP (Patrick, 1988); assets, in fact, while 
allowing for shock absorption may also imply some moral hazard and push 
farmers to take higher risks. Land extension may show the same 
contradictory trends even if some studies prove a positive relation of this 
attribute with the WTP (Akter et al., 2009). Clarke and Kalani (2011) find an 
interesting irregular pattern where the highest take-up ratio of insurance is 
expressed by the intermediate wealth levels; in fact, too poor farmers may 
have nothing to lose and do not need to insure, while very rich farmers may 
have other options than weather index insurance (Castellani et al., 2013).  
Other factors positively affecting the WTP for insurance relate to cash 
holdings (Cole et al., 2009) but also opposite relations can be found, 
especially in the case cash comes from aid.  In fact, in different studies, 
subsidies or initial endowments in experiments are the main element 
inducing farmers to subscribe insurance (Sarris, 2013) but this fact may 
distort farmers’ decisions and the interpretation of the results of the studies 
on the WTP. As  Sakurai and Reardon (1997) point out, public food aid too 
may have moral hazard effects on farmers’ decisions.  
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 Patt et al. (2009) focus on behavioral factors: emotions and trust in 
the suppliers, in the product or in oneself. In fact, for example, people are 
sensitive to the channel or strategy used to offer insurance as these elements 
may affect their knowledge and trust. Trust is found very relevant by Cole et 
al. (2009) and Hill and Robles (2011). Another important fact outlined is the 
role of social links in subscribing insurance, as potential customers are more 
likely to participate if they subscribe the contract as a group (Hill et al., 
2013) especially if the potential subscriber is not educated. Akter et al. 
(2009) or Giné et al. (2008) stress the importance of customer awareness in 
increasing the WTP. 
 Customers’ knowledge and awareness have to do with the complexity 
of the contract which, in turn, is defined by its attributes: price, maturity, 
delivery methodology, chosen index, triggers or thresholds, compensations, 
etc. Conditions directly affect the WTP, and quite often, their effect is 
combined; the products offered may be characterized by different degrees of 
complexity and of flexibility in adapting to the ability of the farmers to 
understand the product and to his/her specific situation. Cole et al. (2009), in 
fact, find that demand for insurance may not be so reactive to price per se but 
to the combination of price and suitability of the index chosen, or other 
contract conditions. In this evaluation, transaction costs are important. They 
can be borne by the supplier (and then charged as loading on premium) or by 
the customer, who has, for example, to travel to the supplier seat to buy the 
product. In this respect, Hill et al. (2013), find that cutting transaction cost 
increases the WTP: they find that distribution through local risk-sharing 
groups is preferred by customers.   
 The product terms and conditions affect the important issue of basis 
risk amplitude (Hill et al., 2013; Fuchs and Wolff, 2011): the more the 
product is built such that farmers compensations are aligned with actual 
losses, the higher is the preference for insurance.  In a pilot study in Ethiopia 
by Volpi (2005), farmers explicitly express the fear of low correlation 
between rainfall patterns at the weather station and those of the area where 
they had their plots.  
 More generally, farmers appears to be sensitive to the ability of the 
product to fine-tune as compared to their situation. In the study of Hill and 
Robles (2011) conducted in Ethiopia, the basic idea is that farmers are 
diversified in their production and preference structures and need to be 
offered diversified insurance contracts. They in fact maintain that offering 
each farmer a combination of weather derivatives is better than offering an 
index insurance, somehow standardized. Lack of customization and of 
flexibility may hamper the adaptability of products to farmers. Farmers are 
different for various reasons; an intriguing one proposed in the paper is that, 
in order to diversify among members of the same risk-sharing group, they 
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may make different production decisions as compared to neighbors. Also the 
study by McIntosh et al. (2013)  which focuses on the use of fertilizers and 
their relationship with weather index insurance in Ethiopia highlights the role 
of product design and the challenge represented by fine tuning the products. 
The study of Volpi (2005) also stresses that farmers are aware of multiple 
risk exposure and of the fact that insurance only compensates for one risk.  
In fact, single-risk protection may not appeal if the price is not low enough. 
Therefore, the more the contract is flexible in its terms and conditions, the 
more likely is that the potential customers would buy insurance for a given 
price. This supports the proposal of  a compound index product (Elabed et 
al., 2013) or a combination of different weather derivatives including more 
than one risk (Hill et al., 2013)  can contribute to overcome the asserted 
rigidity of such contracts. 
 Together with the flexibility of the contract, farmers’ attitude toward 
risk and strategies to face it are other key factors. Perceived risk exposure is 
found to be positively associated with higher WTP for insurance (Hill et al., 
2013). The attitude towards this risk exposure may end up in contradictory 
outcomes, sometimes counter-intuitively, as other factor complicates the 
decision. A negative correlation between risk aversion and WTP is found, 
under specific conditions, by Hill et al. (2013) for Ethiopia. Giné et al. 
(2008), in their study on India, find that risk averse households are less likely 
to purchase if unfamiliar with the insurance contract or with the dealer. Hill 
and Viceiza (2010), on the contrary, in their field experiment in Southern 
Ethiopia related to the purchase of fertilizers and their links with index 
insurance, show, among other things, a positive link between the purchase of 
insurance and risk aversion.  
 Risk exposure and attitude towards risk affect the WTP in different 
ways considering that households have different strategies to face the various 
situations, ex-ante and ex-post. Sakurai and Reardon (1997), for example, 
find that wealthier, more self-insured farmers demand less formal drought 
insurance.  Off-farm income and livestock holdings induce lower demand for 
formal insurance, as both allow to implement self-insurance mechanisms and 
to diversify. Nevertheless, this depend on the stratum of the sample they 
analyze; for example, in the upper stratum, neither off-farm income nor 
livestock holdings have a significant effect.  Akter et al. (2009) too stress the 
role of different risk management strategies: extension of the areas, 
household head occupation, land ownership and farm size, are all element 
related to the degree of ability to self manage risk. Gautam et al. (1994), do 
not test only for risk attitude but, in their study in India, empirically test for 
the joint hypothesis of risk avoidance and welfare smoothing, with the aim of 
studying the latent demand due to inadequate risk management strategies. 
Their results prove that this demand is high. The study of Hill et al. (2013) 
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focuses on the demand for weather insurance based on products and farmers’ 
characteristics. They also confirm that people with higher risk exposure or, 
with some controversy, who are more risk averse, buy more insurance and 
that potential customers tend to optimize risk management by combining 
informal risk sharing and insurance depending on levels and types of risk. To 
investigate these effects, estimates on risk aversion, time preference and the 
possibility to count on neighbors or the community for help in case of shocks 
as well as source of finance for emergency (credit, sale of assets, 
participation in emergency-insurance groups such as the iddir or remittances) 
are considered.  
 Norton (et al., 2012) in their study based on experimental games in 
Ethiopia compare different choices among options about how allocate an 
initial cash endowment: taking the drought index insurance, investing in 
simulated savings accounts, participating into risk-sharing groups, or holding 
cash.  Decisions on allocations are observed. Choice of  higher frequencies 
of payouts is recorded as a preference for liquidity but also as a consequence 
of insufficient self-insuring mechanisms which would probably be more 
cost-effective. More frequent choice of insurance over savings and over 
participation in risk sharing groups is another outcome. These results confute 
the common belief that poor farmers would minimize their expenses and the 
related insurance coverage.  Clark and Kalani (2011) in their experiment in 
Ethiopia aim to analyze  the determinants of WTP for index insurance and 
for indemnity insurance. They find that historical risk exposure has an 
important role in positively influencing take-up rates of indemnity insurance. 
In general, participation into risk-sharing groups has the same effects on both 
types of insurance. They interestingly stress the rationality of farmers in 
choosing their products, interpreting  eventual low take up rates with the 
unsuitability of the contract for the potential clientele.  
 This goes back to the issue of the product design and the need to 
make it suitable to the target clientele with flexible conditions. The preceding 
discussion showed that clientele expectations and preferences may also 
depend on the clientele’s ability to adopt alternative or complementary risk 
management strategies. Therefore, insurance can be perceived differently 
depending on the characteristics of the customer which explains different 
signs in the correlation between WTP and some causing factors. Some of the 
cases of controversial effects mentioned above can indeed be explained in 
such a conceptualization. New insight also comes out of the field research 
presented in this study. 
 
Experiment framework and insurance attributes  
 In order to study how flexibility influences the willingness to pay for 
drought insurance products, we provide, first, a definition of flexibility. We 
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assume that an insurance product is flexible when the product’s attributes 
can be tailored according to the consumer’s characteristics and preferences. 
Among household’s characteristics, existing risk management strategies 
against drought are the main substitutes or complements of insurance and so, 
important determinants of the insurance take-up. This risk management 
perspective is discussed further in the multivariate analysis.            
 In a simple way, we suppose that the utility that each household 
obtains from the insurance product is a linear combination of the attributes, 
𝑋𝑖’s, and a random component, 𝜖: 
𝑈 = �𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖    (1)𝐽
𝑖=1
 
 Equation (1) points to a straightforward approach in both the data 
collection and the empirical analysis. Data was indeed collected through a 
discrete choice experiment with fractional factorial design in which the 
surveyed households were asked to make a choice out of different choice sets 
(Hensher et al., 2005). In discrete choice experiments, each choice set is 
made up of two or more alternatives where one alternative might be the 
status-quo. In our case, the non status-quo alternatives are characterized by 
insurance product’s attributes while the status-quo alternative is the no-
insurance situation, that is the current household’s status. The experiment 
complies with orthogonality in the product’s attributes (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Apart from traditional advantages of choice modeling (CEI, 2001), providing 
different combinations of premium and other attributes allows to test for 
heterogeneity in the household’s preferences. The latter is the research 
question that we want to address in this study. In fact, we can argue that the 
greater the heterogeneity, the greater the necessity to provide flexible 
products. The expected results of this small-scale field experiment can 
however be controversial, also due to the questionability of the experiments 
themselves, as previously explained, but, bearing in mind these limits, can 
provide interesting insights. The theoretical model and the empirical 
methodology are discussed in detail in the next sections.  
 The experiment was conducted on a sample of 205 rural Ethiopian 
households in the Wolayta zone (SNNP region) over a period of 3 weeks, in 
November 2013. The households were randomly selected from a larger 
sample of 360 households already involved in a three-year data collection 
project (2010–2013).  The surveyed farmers were from three Kebele, i.e. the 
smallest administrative unit, improperly referred to as villages in this study. 
The villages are representative of three different agro-ecological zones of the 
Wolayta area which differ in terms of altitude, rainfall pattern, and 
households’ livelihood strategies. The zones are named by the Ethiopian 
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Ministry of Agriculture after their characteristic crops: the ginger and coffee 
zone, barley and wheat zone, and maize and root crop zone.  
 We decided to keep the field experiment as simple as possible. We 
opted for a an insurance product with a limited number of attributes and 
attribute levels. The reasons for that are twofold: first, the percentage of 
illiterate people was high (37%), and second, neither traditional crop 
insurance nor other kinds of formal insurance were available at the time 
when the survey was conducted. These two problems can hinder the ability 
of interviewees to fully understand the insurance product and the utility that 
they can derive from using it. A preliminary training in groups of 10-20 
people was also provided to all households. The training focused especially 
on drought probability, insurance and the problem of basis risk, the latter 
explained by the fact that the rainfall is hypothetically measured at the main 
district town.         
 The hypothetical product offered to the households was not designed 
according to the real rainfall data but according to the revealed perceived 
drought frequencies. Data on perceived frequencies were retrieved from a 
previous experiment that was conducted in the same villages in March 2013 
(Castellani et al., 2014). We picked two different frequencies each that are 
representative of the observed distributions: 2 and 3 years for moderate 
drought, and 10 and 18 years for severe drought. The product pays a fixed 
indemnity when either a moderate or a severe drought occurs. We provided 
households with simple and straightforward definitions of both moderate and 
severe drought that were agreed upon during preliminary focus group 
activities. A moderate drought was defined as “insufficient rainfall that leads 
to a reduction of production yield and lack of grazing land”, and a severe 
drought was defined as “no rainfall at all that results into no agricultural 
production, no consumption, high poverty and death of human beings, 
animals and plants.” Even though the definitions seems to be on a very vague 
level, the fact that they were established together with farmers make them 
relevant for the experiment. This is supported by the stated drought 
frequencies. Indeed, the average perceived frequency of a moderate drought 
is one every almost 3 years (Std Dev. 1.14), while the average perceived 
frequency of a severe drought is one every almost 10 years (Std Dev. 4.83).  
 The fair premium for every insurance product was established 
beforehand. The objective was to build reasonable hypothetical products that 
households can actually afford. The range of the fair premium was settled 
employing as a benchmark the premium of a drought insurance product that 
was already available in another area of the same region and had proved to 
be somewhat successful (Hill and Robles, 2011). The fair premium levels 
were ETB 50 and ETB 100. The indemnity was then determined as the ratio 
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between the fair premium and the selected probability of drought, that is the 
inverse of the frequency.  
 Each household was faced with eight different choice situations, four 
for moderate drought and four for severe drought. In each choice situation, 
the respondent could opt for one of two different insurance products or the 
status quo alternative. As one insurance alternative was selected, the 
interviewee was asked to choose how many insurance contracts of that type 
of insurance he/she would be willing to buy, considering the total premium 
to be paid and the total expected indemnity.         
 Apart from frequency, premium and indemnity, the other product’s 
attributes are: loading, home delivery, and deferred payment. The former is a 
non explicit attribute since it is only implied in the premium. The loading 
consists of a 15% increase in the fair premium that we deem as devoted by 
the insurer to cover the operating cost. This percentage is also hypothetical 
and does not necessarily correspond to the real cost. The loading attribute 
levels are therefore “loading” and “not loading”. Home delivery implies that 
the insurance product is delivered and paid at household’s door step as well 
as when the indemnity would be redeemed. In the opposite case, the 
household should go to the main district town to perform all the transactions. 
This attribute allows for possible transaction costs that arise from the 
opportunity cost of time and the potential transportation costs. All main 
district towns are between 15 and 20 km from the villages’ administration 
units that are usually located at the village’s midpoint. Whereas some 
households might live very close to the district town and have easy access on 
foot, for other households the distance might be relevant implying high 
transaction costs. The last attribute is the deferred payment. Households can 
pay the premium either before (at the beginning of the Belg season) or after 
the rainy season (at the end of the Meher season). A deferred payment 
implies an extra premium of 10% as interest rate. Whether the deferred 
payment is preferable depends on two factors. First, the period after the rainy 
season corresponds to the main harvest and most of crop cash income is 
generated in this period. Despite the experiment should avoid the liquidity 
problem, liquidity could however still be perceived as a constraint and 
households might prefer to pay the premium when most of the liquidity is 
available. Second, households can be impatient and discount future payments 
more than the implied interest rate. This also can contribute to prefer the 
deferred payment.  
 Figure 1 provides an example of the choice set. 
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Figure 1 Example of the choice set 
Choise set 1 A B SQ 
Frequency 
(years) 
3 2  
Premium 
(ETB) 
100 110 (including 
interest) 
 
Indemnity 
(ETB) 
300 200  
Deferred 
Payment 
No Yes  
Home 
delivery 
Yes No  
 □ □ □ 
Number of 
contracts 
Premium 
(Indemnity) 
Premium 
(Indemnity) 
 
1 100 (300) 110 (200)  
2 200 (600) 220 (400)  
 … …  
  
 The next sections provide an univariate and multivariate analyses 
respectively.    
                  
Univariate analysis of attribute heterogeneity 
 On a theoretical basis, the hypothesis that there exists a demand for a 
flexible insurance product can be tested against the null hypothesis that there 
exists a demand for a standardized product. This can be carried out by testing 
how different are the choices made by the surveyed households. In 
particular, we want to examine the variation in the preferred insurance 
attributes. Preliminary insights can be gained by analyzing the responses of 
households that stated to be willing to buy at least one of the offered 
insurance products. The total households that decided to buy at least one 
product are 192 or 94% of the sample. This figure includes 117 (57%) 
households that opted for the product alternative in all the eight choice 
occasions, 32 (16%) in seven choice occasions, 18 (0.9%) in six choice 
occasions, and 25 (12%) in less than six choice occasions. The average total 
premiums are ETB 146 and ETB 151 for moderate and severe drought 
insurance respectively. 
 In order to compare different households, the first step is to identify a 
virtual product for each household that consists of the average attribute 
levels of the preferred products. Since each household stated to buy a certain 
number of contracts of the preferred products, the average can therefore be 
determined as a weighted mean of the attribute levels where the weights are 
the associated total premiums that the household is willing to pay. Table 1 
reports the weighted averages and the standard deviations. However, these 
figures do not provide any information on the level of heterogeneity in the 
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attributes. The standard deviations in absolute values are not comparable and 
there are no statistical values associated. We develop a simple heterogeneity 
proxy given by the ratio of the mean and standard deviation and we construct 
confidence intervals through bootstrapping. The results (Figure1 and Figure 
2) suggest that for the demand of both moderate and severe drought products 
most of heterogeneity is generated by the loading, home delivery, and 
deferred payment attributes. The loading increases the premium and for 
some households this increase in the cost of the product can reduce their 
willingness to pay. The home delivery entails a reduction in transaction costs 
and so, contrary to the loading, can increase the willingness to pay. The 
deferred payment, on the one hand, heightens the premium but, on the other 
hand, allows to make up for the premium when most of agricultural income 
is generated. By comparing attributes of moderate and severe drought 
insurance, preference heterogeneity seems to be more relevant for severe 
drought products.  
 The heterogeneity in the attributes is, in turn, explained by the 
heterogeneity in the socio-economic characteristics of the households. This 
can however be tested only through a multivariate analysis. Besides, given 
the high percentage (94%) of households that accepted to buy at least one 
product, these results can be partially led by the design of the experiment. 
Only a multivariate analysis that includes all households can control for the 
product design. We carry out this analysis in the next section.                       
Table 1 Weighted average and standard deviation of attribute levels. 
Attribute/Drought impact Moderate Severe 
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Premium (ETB) 97.15 12.79 90.23 14.48 
Indemnity (ETB) 223.35 33.83 1113.81 244.74 
Frequency of drought (years) 2.56 0.26 13.89 2.15 
Loading (1-0) 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Home delivery (1-0) 0.73 0.26 0.64 0.26 
Deferred payment (1-0) 0.50 0.19 0.47 0.23 
 
Figure 2 Mean and confidence interval (95%) of the Mean-Std. Dev. ratio of product 
attributes for moderate drought. 
 
Notes: bootstrapped confidence intervals with 1,000 repetitions. 
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Figure 3 Mean and confidence interval (95%) of the Mean-Std. Dev. ratio of product 
attributes for severe drought. 
 
Notes: bootstrapped confidence intervals with 1,000 repetitions. 
 
Multivariate methodology 
 Heterogeneity in the demand of a product implies that the utility that 
each individual obtains if the product were standardized is remarkable 
dissimilar. In equation (1), heterogeneity can be expressed with individual 
specific parameters of the attributes that allow for taste variation.  Assume 
that a household n faces a choice among J alternatives in each of T choice 
situations. Equation (1) can be reformulated as follows: 
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑛′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡      (2) 
where 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 are the attributes and  𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 is a random term. The coefficient 
vector 𝛽𝑛 is unobserved by the researcher and varies across households with 
density 𝑓(𝛽𝑛|Ω), where  are the parameters of the distribution that are to be 
estimated. The stochastic element, 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡, is also unobserved and different 
assumptions on its distribution result in different choice models. As is 
usually common in choice analysis, we impose the condition that 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 is 
independent and identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 (or 
Gumbel) across all n, j, and t (Hensher et al., 2005). Conditional on 𝛽𝑛, the 
logit probability of household n choosing alternative j in the choice situation 
t is: 
𝜋𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑 = 𝑒𝛽𝑛′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖
 , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝐽      (3) 
 The standard logit model, as expressed by (3), does not allow for 
unobserved characteristics that can induce correlation among the alternatives 
in a choice situation and among the choices over time. The mixed 
multinomial logit model, i.e. the unconditional logit probability, overcomes 
these restrictions by allowing for the variance in the unobserved household-
specific parameters and, therefore, does not exhibit the property of 
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independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Revelt and Train, 1998). 
The mixed logit probability is: 
𝜋𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑥 = �� 𝑒𝛽𝑛′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖
� 𝑓(𝛽𝑛|Ω) , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝐽      (4) 
 Equation (4) is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated for 
different values of 𝛽𝑛. It follows that the mixed logit probability for the 
sequence of choices is: 
Π𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑥 = ��� 𝑒𝛽𝑛′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖
�
𝑡
𝑓(𝛽𝑛|Ω) , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝐽      (5) 
 In (5), we want to estimate , that is, the population parameters that 
describe the distribution of individual parameters (Revelt and Train, 1998). 
Moreover, normally distributed zero mean error components based on 
household’s characteristics are added to the mixed logit model in order to 
allow for different variances of the insurance alternatives and the stastus-quo 
option, that is, to accommodate heteroskedasticity (Scarpa et al., 2007).   
 
The risk management framework and results 
 In the surveyed area as well as in most of rural Ethiopia, both 
traditional and index-based crop insurance are not available. The implication 
for our analysis is that there is no insurance alternative to the hypothetical 
products offered in the experiment. The status-quo is therefore a no-choice 
option. Potential substitutes or complements of insurance can be the set of 
different risk management and coping strategies that the households 
implement to deal with drought risk. Some traditional strategies can indeed 
be ineffective when the risk is systemic. For instance, local risk sharing 
networks provide a limited support in case of drought if most of members of 
the networks are affected. According to Morduch (1995), poor households in 
low-income countries cope with risk in a two-step procedure, that is, 
through, first, income smoothing and, second, consumption smoothing. In 
the presence of drought risk, the income smoothing can be pursued by, for 
example, carrying out low-risk and low-return livelihood strategies, 
acquiring drought-resistant production technology, such as improved seeds, 
or diversifying the income sources. We focus on the role of diversification 
because the data does not allow to know whether the seeds used by farmers 
are drought-resistant and to single out which activities can be considered as 
with low-risk and low-return. In particular, we employ a measure of crop 
diversification and the ratio of off-farm income over total income. The 
former measure is a Herfindhal index of the land diversification. The higher 
the index, the greater the diversification of land over different crops. On the 
other hand, consumption smoothing strategies consists of “…borrowing and 
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saving, depleting and accumulating nonfinancial assets, adjusting labor 
supply, and employing formal and informal insurance arrangements.” 
(Morduch, 1995, p. 104). Whether the household can have access to 
borrowing and new job opportunities when a drought occurs cannot be 
predicted in advance. Moreover, local credit and job markets might also be 
hindered by the effects of a drought. In this regards, Sen (1981) suggests that 
droughts lead to a collapse of the demand for local services and crafts. In the 
absence of formal insurance and the presence of ineffective informal 
insurance, as discussed above, the accumulation of saving and nonfinancial 
assets seems to be the best available strategy against drought. In rural 
Ethiopia, livestock holdings are the main assets. Livestock raising is also an 
important source of income for many households. However, the sale of 
assets such as livestock can be ineffective if local markets are thin and fairly 
inactive (Fafchamps et al., 1998). If this is the case, distress sales lead to a 
lower price than the real market value and livestock purchases turn to be 
partially irreversible investments (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Fafchamps 
and Pender, 1997). According to the authors’ experience, in the surveyed 
area the livestock markets are located in the main district cities and they are 
both thick and very active. Beside a measure of total net assets, we consider 
also a proxy of livestock diversification that is a Herfindhal index as in the 
case of crops. The total net assets consist of livestock holdings, savings, 
agricultural assets and nonagricultural assets, net of total borrowings. 
Finally, the status-quo and village constants are also included in the 
equation. The former controls for the constant either gain or loss in the utility 
if the household remains in the status-quo and does not choose any 
insurance. The village constants allows for unknown effects of differences 
between villages such as rainfall patterns or     
 The equations of insurance alternatives are a linear combination of 
the attributes excluding the frequency of drought since it is assumed to be 
collinear with the indemnity. We include also two zero-mean error 
components. The firs is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
interviewee is illiterate and 0 otherwise. As stated above, illiterate people can 
be less able to appraise the value of insurance. The second is a dummy 
variable that allows for the gender. The female are usually not primarily 
involved in the agricultural activity, although they have some tasks, and so 
they might be less aware of the impact of drought on the agricultural 
production.  
 The distribution of the random parameters are tested in a step-wise 
procedure and the final selection is discussed in the results. In particular, we 
do not impose any particular restriction on the distribution of the premium to 
allow for inconsistent behaviors that are observed in Castellani et al. (2014).    
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 Table 2 presents the results of the estimates. First, the specifications 
are reasonably good. In both models the zero-mean error components are 
very statistically significant and this implies the both illiteracy and gender 
are important determinants of the capacity to appreciate the utility of index-
based insurance. On the contrary, apart from the constant and the proxy for 
livestock diversification in the “moderate” model, most of risk management 
variables in the status-quo equation are not statistically significant. These 
results are contradictory with, for instance, Sakurai and Reardon (1997) and 
Akter et al. (2009) where they find that the risk management strategies are 
significant determinants. This suggests two possible explanations. The first is 
that these strategies are deemed ineffective by the households to deal with 
drought. This hypothesis is somewhat supported by the change in sign or 
magnitude of coefficients from the “moderate” model to the “severe” model. 
The other possible explanation is that as the lack of disturbing effects, such 
as credit constraints or trust issues, in small-scale field experiments (Hill and 
Veceisza, 2010), the effect of risk management strategies is also irrelevant in 
the decision process. This hypothesis can be tested only against a real 
scheme.  
 The analysis of heterogeneity of attributes put forward that an 
important even though partial taste variation is present and it is generated by 
the indemnity and the home payment variables. We considered a normal 
distribution of coefficients. Premium, loading and deferred payment are 
instead considered as fixed parameters because the standard deviations 
turned out to be statistically insignificant in all the different model 
specifications that were estimated. As expected, the coefficients of the 
premium and the indemnity have the opposite signs in both models. 
However, while in the “moderate” model the signs are consistent with the 
theory, that is negative for premium and positive for indemnity, in the 
“severe” model the signs are inverted. This inconsistency is similar to 
Castellani et al. (2013). An explanation rests on the hypothesis that the 
insurance for severe drought have no close substitutes and is alike to a Giffen 
good. A necessary and sufficient condition for insurance to be a Giffen good 
is that absolute risk aversion either increase or decrease sufficiently rapidly 
(Briys, Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1989). The price increase can be translated to 
a wealth decrease, i.e. wealth effect. If this negative wealth effect heightens 
the absolute risk aversion rapidly, then the individual may purchase more 
insurance, even though the price increases. Another explanation comes from 
Norton et al. (2012) where they find that households prefer higher frequency 
of payout. In our case, severe drought is a very low frequency event and the 
frequency effect may prevail the price and indemnity effects. The estimates 
of the mean and standard deviation of the indemnity’s coefficient imply that 
the sign is relevant for almost 73% of households in both models. For the 
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home delivery attribute, the coefficient is positive and the percentage of 
households is 80% and 74% for the “moderate” model and “severe” model 
respectively. The magnitude of the mean of coefficients though indicates that 
the home delivery attribute is more important for the severe drought 
insurance products. This result hints that transportation costs as well as the 
opportunity cost of time can be detrimental in the decision to buy insurance. 
This result is consistent with Hill et al. (2013) where insurance delivery 
through local risk-sharing networks turned out to be important.  
 The loading and deferred payment attributes appeared to have fixed 
parameters. While for the deferred payment attribute the coefficient is not 
significant in both models. for the loading attribute it is statistically 
significant only the “severe” model and the sign is negative as expected.              
Table 2 Estimates of mixed logit of both moderate and severe drought insurance models 
Model Moderate Severe 
Variable Estimate Std Err. Estimate Std Err. 
Insurance equations 
         Premium -0.011** 0.006 0.019*** 0.005 
Indemnity 0.006*** 0.002 -0.001*** 0.000 
Sts Dev. Indemnity 0.010*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.000 
Loading -0.101 0.753 -1.500** 0.837 
Home delivery 1.878*** 0.278 2.229*** 0.370 
Std Dev. Home delivery 2.213*** 0.361 3.319*** 0.474 
Deferred Payment -0.118 0.139 -0.295 0.214 
     Err. Comp. Illiterate 3.862*** 1.114 4.675*** 1.055 
Err. Comp. Gender 3.392*** 0.726 3.948*** 0.731 
     Status-quo equation 
         Constant -9.760** 4.069 -6.187 4.237 
Crop diversification 4.358 2.961 -3.005 2.013 
Share of off-fam income -0.964 1.468 -1.820 1.599 
Net assets (log) 0.337 0.360 0.433 0.408 
Livestock diversification -3.781** 1.679 -2.538 1.769 
     N. of Obs 2423 2424 
LR – χ2 (12) 82.45*** 72.86*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.23 
*** Significance level at 1% 
    **Significance level at 5% 
    * Significance level at 10% 
        
Conclusion 
 This study aims to contribute to the literature on index-based 
insurance in low-income countries and, in particular, the demand of drought 
insurance. The main objectives are, first, to assess how product’s 
heterogeneity is important in the decision to buy insurance and, second, to 
test whether the available risk management strategies are possible 
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complements or substitutes of insurance. We believe as in the case of Hill 
and Robbles (2011), that insurance products with flexible attributes can 
increase the take-up likelihood since farmers are heterogeneous on the base 
of socio-economic characteristics and have a different perception of the 
value of the insurance. The heterogeneity is analyzed from the perspective of 
product’s attributes, i.e. contractual conditions such as: premium and 
loading, indemnity, period of payment of the premium, and place where the 
product is delivered. In particular, we consider the variation in the preferred 
attributes and their effects on the willingness to pay. The data collected 
through a discrete choice experiment allows to test for heterogeneity. We 
conducted the experiment in three rural villages in Southern Ethiopia.  
 Preliminary insights provided by a univariate analysis suggest that 
most of heterogeneity is generated by three attributes: loading to cover for 
administration and distribution costs, home delivery, and deferred payment. 
This means that the surveyed households, while differing on different 
aspects, are differentiating their strategies mainly basing the decision on the 
costs of the product (with and without loadings), the implicit transaction 
costs related to delivery, the cost linked to the possibility to delay payments. 
This outcomes may derive from the fact that most of the interviewed farmers 
present very similar socio-economic structures and similar risk management 
strategies, only differentiating on the size which may allow different attitude 
towards the overall cost of the new insurance product 
 On the other hand, the multivariate analysis conducted through the 
estimation of a mixed logit put forward that the heterogeneity is explained by 
the indemnity and home delivery attributes. These results hint that the size of 
the compensation in case of drought and the transactions costs are perceived 
in a different way from household to household. The added error components 
suggest further that if the consumer is illiterate and/or female (on average 
less educated), she can be less able to appreciate the real value of insurance. 
Another source of heterogeneity is also provided by the type of drought 
impact. The different estimates of the models for moderate and severe 
drought insurance indeed suggests that the households follow two dissimilar 
decision processes that can be somewhat explained by the difference in terms 
of drought frequency. Besides, in the case of the “severe” model, the results 
are not consistent with law of demand. This apparent contradictory outcomes 
may derive, indeed, from the heterogeneity of farmers and, as portrayed in 
Castellani et al. (2014), from their rationality, confirming Clark and Kalani 
(2011)  which induces farmers to appreciate the contract in the case they can 
better handle and assess (moderate case). We can in fact assume that in the 
extreme case (severe drought), the farmer realizes her inability to duly 
evaluate the conditions and cost/benefits.  
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 To sum up, the analysis demonstrates that the difference in 
households’ characteristics and perceptions implies that a generalized offer 
of standardized insurance products may not be the optimal solution. 
Individual preferences, also based on the ability of the farmers to understand 
the products and different objective situations, imply that rational farmers 
express a quite diversified demand which should be satisfied with a flexible 
offer of insurance products.  
 Diversifying the offer of insurance products in rural areas, then, 
becomes a suggestion and at the same time a challenge for insurance 
companies and other entities involved in pilot projects or actual marketing. 
This suggestion would appear an obvious statement for the offer of insurance 
but it has been often forgotten in low-income countries where the potential 
customers’ preferences are often ignored (in microfinance and 
microinsurance) for the sake of keeping the products simple. Potential 
customers show, on the contrary, their sensitivity to the suitability of the 
products to their actual needs. 
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